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Abstract
Knowing the reflection of game theory and ethics, we develop
a mathematical representation to bridge the gap between the
concepts in moral philosophy (e.g., Kantian and Utilitarian)
and AI ethics industry technology standard (e.g., IEEE P7000
standard series for Ethical AI). As an application, we demon-
strate how human value can be obtained from the experimen-
tal game theory (e.g., trust game experiment) so as to build
an ethical AI. Moreover, an approach to test the ethics (right-
ness or wrongness) of a given AI algorithm by using an iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game experiment is discussed as an
example. Compared with existing mathematical frameworks
and testing method on AI ethics technology, the advantages
of the proposed approach are analyzed.
Introduction
Pace of AI development brings up the general worriment on
human life (e.g., physical safety, mental happiness) and so-
cial impacts (e.g., workforce displacement, economics in-
equality, etc) (Allen, Wallach, and Smit 2006). Such wor-
riment is not unreasonable. Because the outcome of AI
technology appears unpredictable, which significantly dif-
fers from our daily productions whose outcome is deduc-
tive, predictable and controllable based on existed physics,
chemistry, biology, mathematics science and engineering.
Figure 1: AI ethics issues in AI-Human interaction.
On AI and human interactions, issues can be presented in
Fig. 1. AI safety, which can be categrised as physical safety
and psychological safety, is well understood (Lasota, Fong,
and Shah 2017) and related industry technology standards
have also been exemplified established (e.g., ISO 10218-
1:2011, ISO 15066). However, the ethical issues on AI deci-
sion making are remained. The questions can be expressed
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as how to embed human values into AI, or how to align
AI behaviors with human value (Chatila et al. 2017). More
strictly speaking, methodologies to guide AI ethics research
and design are needed.
Methodology for AI ethics research and design is not
blank. Ongoing AI ethic industry technology standards
IEEE P7000 is based on Value Sensitive Design method
(Friedman et al. 2013), and IEEE P7010 is based on happi-
ness index methods. We notice that, all the methods applied
on AI ethics are inductive. These methods appear not struc-
tural and lacking of convincing, which could lead to conflict
of the rules, overload or blind spot, referring to (Sowa 1999).
Logically, methods can be either inductive or deductive, but
till now, there has been little research going on deductive
method for AI ethics. So, for AI to be aligned with human
value, a rigorous method,which has a inclusive and clear
mathematical paradigm, and is theoretical computable, ex-
perimentally testable and industry technology conductible,
is desired.
In this paper, we introduce a mathematical presentation
for AI-human interaction, which can tolerate the conflict of
Kantian and Utilitarian moral philosophy, and turn the inter-
actions computable when human values are included. More
importantly, we demonstrate that the human value in non-
cooperate game condition can be taken from laboratory for
AI ethics behavior design. We show a technology to test
the ethics (rightness or wrongness) of a given AI algorithm
quantitatively. Comparison with related literatures about the
science and technology on AI ethics issues, as well as the
further researches will be discussed.
Technology Note
Aiming at developing practical approach to transit human
value into AI industry production, a brief glossary of termi-
nology is summarized as follows, instead of describing the
concepts in moral philosophy, game theory or experimental
behavior science in a very detailed way.
AI Ethics AI Ethics, in this paper, is about the ’right-
ness or wrongness’ of an AI agent behaviors when interact-
ing with human being (in AI-human interaction). Here, the
AI agent is an individual (e.g., autonomous cars, robotics,
drones, financial agents, an so on), and its behaviors are
based on its solo decisions. The ’rightness or wrongness’,
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as a concept in moral philosophy, is defined by Kantian and
Utilitarian simultaneously.
Kantian and Utilitarian focus on the input and output of
an AI-human interaction, respectively. Mathematically (Os-
borne and Rubinstein 1994), the input can be presented in
strategy space as the vector of an action, and the outcome
can be presented in outcome space as the vector of the results
of the interaction. Strategy space is the space of all possi-
ble actions (behaviors) which an AI agent or a human being
can apply in the interaction. The outcome space presents the
payoff (physical and mental reward and cost) of each sub-
ject involved in the strategy interaction. The structure of the
outcome space can be multi-dimension and various presen-
tation (total social outcome, fairness, etc).
Experimental game theory is an inter-disciplinary area
of game theory and human behavior experiments, studying
human decision-making. In non-cooperation game, the force
(incentive, due to Kantian, e.g., fairness behavior in dictator
game, altruism and punishment in public good games) drives
the behaviors deviated from Utilitarian (rational choice) has
been extensively studied.
Human value alignment in this report, we follow IEEE
global initiative ethical design. Quantitatively, the human
value is specified as the Kantian value, which is beyond
the rational Utilitarian value in this paper, and is expected
to be aligned by AI in industry technology standard. The
main point of this paper is to accommodate Utilitarian and
Kantian with a computational mathematical paradigm, with
which we can use human behavior data to transit the human
value to ethical AI.
Mathematical representation
AI Ethics, as well as moral philosophy or common good-
ness willing, needs a mathematical representation before it
could be conducted practically in the AI production life-
cycle. Or, to a large extent, the investigation or discussion
is not a technical question anyways and let us fall into chaos
among game theory, morality, psychology, personal dogma-
tism, etc. Our developing the mathematical presentation for
AI ethics is not along, and comparison between ours and the
previous (Conitzer et al. 2017; Letchford, Conitzer, and Jain
2008) will be introduced later.
According to the AI Ethics definition, we can formulate
the behavior interactions and the outcome as
Sai ⊗ Sbj → O, (1)
in which, Sai indicates an AI agent applies strategy i in its
strategy space Sa, Sbi indicates a human being applies strat-
egy j in its strategy space Sb, and O indicates the outcome
space. This kind of representation has been used to investi-
gate the reflection of game theory and ethics, see reference
(Kuhn 2004) and (Conitzer et al. 2017). In such a represen-
tation, if one side’s strategy is fixed (supposing strategy j in
Sb is given and known by AI agent), then the decision mak-
ing turns to optimization question, and Sai determines the
outcome, which is the basis of evaluation of the ethics of AI.
Figure 2: Wait or pass game. This is a strategy interaction
game, in which an AI agent (A) meets a human being (B) on
a narrow bridge.
An example Using a Wait or Pass dilemma game, we il-
lustrate the meaning of the concepts in technology note and
the formula above. Figure 2 demonstrates a situation, in
which an AI agent meets a human being agent on a narrow
bridge, but is too narrow for two agents to pass simultane-
ously. At this moment, for both AI agent and human agent,
the optional behaviors (or strategies) can only be wait or
pass, presented as
Sa = {wait, pass}, (2)
Sb = {wait, pass} (3)
At first stage, Utilitarian but not Kantian, we ignore
the Kantian value (denoted as K, indicates rightness or
wrongness) of an action by setting Kwait = Kpass = 0, but
only take the outcome into account as a rational individual
in traditional game theory. If both use ’wait’ strategy, both
agent lost 1 (denoted as gain -1) unit of utility, if both use
’pass’ strategy, both agent lost 2 (denoted as gain -2) unit
of utility. And If one uses ’wait’ strategy and the opponent
uses ’pass’ strategy, the ’wait’ strategy user gains -1, and
the ’pass’ strategy user gains 1. So, the outcome space O
includes 4 elements, as the result from 2 (elements belongs
to Sa) times (denoted as ⊗) 2 (total elements belongs to Sb).
More visually, the Values in the outcome space of this game
is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Values presented in the outcome space*
AI agent Human AI agent Human
strategy strategy reward reward
wait wait -1 + Kwait -1
wait pass -1 + Kwait 1
pass wait 1 + Kpass -1
pass pass -2 + Kpass -2
∗ unit of reward is ignored.
Computable AI ethics In game theory view, so-called AI
ethical behavior constraint is to limit the AI strategy in Sa by
evaluating the O, which appears to be a Utilitarian method
and also be computable. Alternatively, in Kantian view, an
AI agent should not select the ethically wrong strategies
in Sa, which is a obligation. The Utilitarian and the Kan-
tian could lead to moral dilemma. As real ethical approach,
we will see that, although various environments and ethical
standard can lead to different results, our approach remains
computable.
1. Totally prioritizing human well-being rule can be imple-
mented on the outcome space, by seeking the maximum
human reward shown in 4th column in Table 1. It is ob-
vious that, when AI agent uses ’wait’ strategy, whatever
human will select, human’s gain will be better. Then such
an AI is considered to be ethical. This scheme, in fact,
turns a non-cooperative game to a cooperative game, and
makes it computable.
2. Prioritizing social well-being (or Pareto efficient), and at-
taching further consideration to social responsibility, the
algorithm will seek the maximum sum of AI agent and
human reward shown in 3rd and 4th column in Table 1. It
can be seen that, in this case, there is no pure solution for
AI strategy in this condition.
3. Partly prioritizing human well-being can be implemented
on the outcome space, by assigning weight of a prioritiz-
ing parameter (β > 1) to the human reward on the fourth
column in Table 1. And then, AI regards its reward as the
sum of the 3rd column plus β times 4th column, conse-
quently the solution for AI will be wait. If an industry
standard for AI ethics wants to emphasize the prioritiz-
ing, the question turns to how to determine the β value.
Once β is determined, the AI ethics is computable.
4. Totally Kantian requires that only the action itself has its
value (rightness or wrongness). Supposing ’to be modest’
is right, we can set Kwait = ∞ in Table 1. Moral rela-
tivism follows Kantian requirement but set Kwait to a fi-
nite value in Table 1. Having Kantian K value included
in the outcome space, the computing technology in game
theory can be applied.
In summary, in the first two (1, 2) conditions, the solution
for AI ethics becomes the solution for optimization problem,
the solution for a cooperative game. And in the last two (3,4)
conditions, the solutions becomes the Nash equilibria, the
solution of a non-cooperation game (e.g., an auto financial
algorithm stock robot competes with its human opponent, or
an gas station robot competes with its neighbor gas station
in a price war). Having the solution, we could make a quan-
titative assessment of how probable of the action of AI agent
being ethical.
As it can be seen, in a real life condition, the strategy
space can be large, and the values are not clear. Here the
presentation provides a framework, which makes AI ethics
negotiable between its stakeholder.
Take human value from trust game
Game theory, originally, studies the fully rational (Utilitar-
ian) behavior in agents interaction. However in experiments,
human subjects’ behaviors deviate significantly from the
fully rational ones, which is exactly the ethical behavior or
the goodness of human being that is expected to be captured
in the experiment data. Since the experiments can provide
statistical results in controlled environment, the value can
be taken quantitatively. In this section, using trust game ex-
periment as an example, we propose an approach to take the
human value — Kantian —from experiments, which can be
transited to ethical AI in technology design.
Trust game In standard trust games, no trust is expected
by fully rational hypothesis, but in experiments trust could
generates a potential gain. The following two person game
shown in Figure 3 is commonly studied by experimental
economists, and summarized by (Smith and Wilson 2014)
in a variety of forms. Person 1 chooses to either (a) end the
game and each person earning with $10 or (b) forego his
sure $10 and turn the decision making to Person 2. If Person
1 chooses (b), then Person 2 decides between (a’) the ex-
perimenter paying her $25 and Person 1 $15 or (b’) the ex-
perimenter paying her $40 and sending Person 1 on his way
with nothing by way of the outcome from the interaction in
this game. Applying the concept of subgame perfect equilib-
rium, in backward induce, a’ and b are dominated strategies,
the Nash equilibrium solution is Person 1 chooses a, and
each person earning with $10.
Experiment results — In the laboratory, referring to the
summary by (Smith and Wilson 2014), the replicable facts
from three different studies are that in 98 (Person 1) first
movers, 52 choose (a) and 46 choose (b), and that of the 46
(Person 2) second movers who have the opportunity to make
a decision, 31 (67%) choose (a’) and 15 (33%) choose (b’).
On average, a Person 1 gains about $10 and a Person 2 gains
about $20.
Figure 3: A trust game in extensive form
Taking the human value from data — So-called human
value, in this paper, is defined as the value that drive human
decisions to deviate from Utilitarian (fully rational) behav-
iors in the game. Despite various explanations towards that,
here we just need to take the value out numerically for AI to
learn or for specifying AI ethical behaviors.
Figure 4 presents the trust game in normal form game,
with the Kantian values of Player 1 (denoted as K1) and
Person 2 (denoted as K2) added. In addition, the outcome
strategy probability of Person 1 and 2 from experiment data
are shown in the last column and raw, respectively. Suppos-
ing the given strategy profile is the Nash equilibrium of this
2 by 2 game, we can calculate the Kantian values of the two
roles respectively, obtain that
K1 ' $0 and K1 ' $7
The experiments have shown that human subjects have in-
centive to benefit the recipients, from which the Kantian
value can be taken to restrict AI ethics. And experiments,
such as dictators game, public goods game, centipede game
,etc., have also shown that human subjects maintain a high
degree of consistency across multiple versions of the simi-
lar game (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Camerer and Foundation
2003). The consistency suggests that it is possible to find the
regulation of the Kantian values over various human subjects
game (Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
Figure 4: The trust game in normal form with Kantian value
included.
Technology for testing AI ethics
Algorithm agent is a typical AI product. To test whether such
a agent aligned human value, we need a practical technology
methods. To this end, we use a laboratory experiment of iter-
ated prisoner dilemma games, in which AI algorithm agents
competes with human subjects. We will illustrate how to dis-
tinguish the ethical algorithm and the unethical ones with
mathematical representation.
Iterated prisoner’s dilemma Promoting social cooper-
ation is an important challenge. The iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD) has been widely studied as the canonical
game theoretic framework representing this issue (Axelrod
1984). In a one-shot two-person prisoner’s dilemma, there
are two pure strategies: cooperate and defect. Each player
receives R if they mutually cooperate; each player receives
P if they mutually defect; if one player cooperates and the
other defects, the defector receives T and the cooperator
receives S, where T > R > P > S guarantees that in
this game the commonly used solution concept Nash equi-
librium is mutual defection, while 2R > T + S implies
that mutual cooperation is actually the socially best out-
come. A typical specification suggested by Axelrod (1984)
is R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, P = 1, shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Payoff matrix of prisoner dilemma.
Traditional human ethics in IPD Robert Axelrod in his
book The Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod 1984) reports
a tournament he organized of the IPD game, whose partici-
pants are from academic colleagues all over the world. Par-
ticipants were asked to devise algorithms to play IPD game
against all the other participants one by one, 500 rounds for
each, with the memory of all the previous round against the
current opponent. The score is the sum of the payoffs of
all the rounds. It is discovered that for fixed-match repeated
game, the algorithm with greedy (unethical) strategies tends
to fail in the long run while the one with more altruistic (eth-
ical) strategies won. He used this to show a possible mech-
anism for the evolution of altruistic (ethical) behaviors from
mechanisms that are initially purely selfish, by natural selec-
tion. By analysing the top-scoring strategies, Axelrod stated
several surveyable (and then ethical) characteristics.
1. Nice: it will not defect before its opponent does.
2. Retaliating: not be a blind optimist. It must sometimes re-
taliate. Cooperation without retaliating could lead to be-
ing exploited ruthlessly.
3. Forgiving: must also be forgiving. Though players will re-
taliate, they need to recover cooperation sometimes from
long runs of revenge and counter-revenge, to maximize
points.
4. Non-envious: The last quality is being non-envious, that
is not striving to score more than the opponent.
We use these as ethics reference to test an algorithm by lin-
guistic analysis (results see Fig 6).
Tested samples We use zero-determinant (ZD) strategies
algorithm as the tested samples, which allows a player to
unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his pay-
off and that of his opponent(Press and Dyson 2012). A
ZD strategy is described by the probabilities of coopera-
tion given the four possible outcomes of the previous round:
p=(p1, p2, p3, p4), where pi, i∈ (1, 2, 3, 4) is the probability
of cooperation given the previous outcomes CC,CD,DC
and DD, respectively. Two ZD algorithms, named as Ex-
torter and Generosity (Wang et al. 2016), are specified
(shown in 6) to demonstrate the ethical testing.
Figure 6: Two tested AI algorithm, named as Extorter and
Generosity. The values in 3nd raw is assigned for the two
Algorithm. ’Y’, ’N’ and ’-’ refer to the ethical requirement
satisfied, not satisfied and indistinguishable, respectively,
which evaluated by linguistic analysis referring to traditional
human ethics suggested by Axelrod mentioned above.
Testing technology Original outcome space is a quadrilat-
eral zone grayed in Fig. 7. However, when the AI agent uses
a ZD algorithm, outcome space is limited and collapsed to
the red or green line. We can distinguish the ethics of the two
algorithm with the lines. As results, Generosity (green line
in Fig 7) is ethical and the Extortion (red line in Fig. 7) is
unethical. Explanation is as follows. For Extorter, its score
se and its human co-player’s score she satisfy
she − 1
se − 1 =
1
3
,
illustrated as red line in Fig 7. While the minimum scores
for both Extorter and the human co-player are smine = s
min
he
= 1, while the maximum scores are smaxe = 3.727 and s
max
he
= 1.907 which is unfair definitively and unethical.
For Generosity, its score sg and its human co-player’s shg
score satisfy
3− shg
3− sg =
1
3
,
illustrated as green line in Fig 7. The maximum scores for
both are 3, which is fair and efficient, and then ethical.
Figure 7: Experimental scores and theoretical prediction.
The red (green) line corresponds to the theoretical outcome
space of Extortion (Generosity) algorithm. Each open circle
indicates a pair of scores of AI and human in the experi-
ments.
Related works
In the tree chart of AI ethics shown in Fig. 1, on the de-
cision making branch, the cooperative game interaction has
been well studied, (e.g., Russell and his colleagues (Had-
fieldmenell et al. 2016)). This work is on the branch of non-
cooperation game.
We have introduced a mathematical representation, which
differs from previous paradigms which can only include
Utilitarian by including Kantian too. So, the game theory
technology for the solution concept can be applied only
dependent on the outcome space. In previous paradigm
(Conitzer et al. 2017), shown in Fig. 8(a), the reward to
switch or not is same (both are 0) which put the agent in
dilemma. On the contrary, in our presentation shown in Fig.
8(b), the reward to switch or not is not same, in which if
switch action is Kantian wrong, K < 0, and the solution is
definitely not to switch.
For the technology of taking human value from exper-
iment practically, we have illustrated an approach to take
the human value (trust and trustworthy) from human sub-
jects experiment. These parameters can be transit to AI
in similar non-cooperation game condition, avoiding AI to
be too tough. Though it is well known that there exists
the human value(e.g., fairness, justices) in the experimen-
tal game theory (Crawford 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Camerer and Foundation 2003), our approach is the first to
take the human value quantitatively as AI ethics controlling
parameter for AI design.
On AI ethics testing technology, in an IPD game, we have
demonstrated how to test an AI algorithm being ethical or
unethical by analyzing the outcome space (shown in Fig. 7).
Our method is a quantitative method which is more practical
and accurate than the linguistic analysis method. Appearing
as check list (as shown in Figure 6), the linguistic analysis
method could lead to arguable results, however, it is wildly
used in IEEE P7000-series ongoing AI ethics industry tech-
nology standard developing nowadays (Chatila et al. 2017).
Figure 8: Comparison of two paradigms. (a) Previous pre-
sentation, how to include the player 2 and player 3’s reward
was not defined, and solution is unknown. (b) In our presen-
tation , the Kantian value of an action is specified and the
solution is computable.
Discussion and conclusion
Our work in this paper provides a quantitative approach,
whose data is derived from human subject experiments
of game theory. As mentioned above, in order for AI to
align human value, a rigorous scientific method is desired.
That means, both quantitative experiment and computational
methods are both necessary.
In the experimental side, experimental behavior science
is well studied (Plott and Smith 2008). Many models, like
public goods game, hawk and dove game, chicken game and
so on, have been developed to well describe various com-
peting conditions. Thus taking human values from these ex-
periments is possible. Experiments of neuroscience can also
be references, from which human values on justices, altru-
ism, fairness and so on can be taken (e.g., (Fehr and Camerer
2007)). Analysing big data from real life human behaviors,
and data from survey (Bonnefon, Shariff, and Rahwan 2016)
or voting on moral dilemma method are valuable.
In the computational side, the merged neural systems,
higher degree morphological agent (Mathews et al. 2017),
collective (emergent) effect of multi AI agents are all needed
for further investigations. Computational methods are not
only meaningful for individual ethical AI, but also for AI
social impacts (e.g., workforce displacement, economics in-
equality, etc). In this direction, social computing methods
(Wang et al. 2007), e.g., agent based simulation, multi-AI-
Human interaction simulation, normative multi agent simu-
lations) are desired too. Nevertheless, we also hope contin-
uous development of linguistic logical computing methods
(Sowa 1999) can help the commendation between the argu-
ments among the stakeholder of various laws, regulations
and cultures, which can help the establishment of the indus-
try technology standard (e.g., IEEE P7000 series).
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